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Introduction
This article addresses a key theme of regulatory activity 
– decision making – in the context of the Government 
Regulatory Practice Initiative (G-Reg).1 This initiative has a 
broad focus on the improvement of regulatory practice and 
the development of the regulatory profession in New Zealand. 
In doing so, the article addresses decision making across 
regulatory systems. The term regulatory systems refers to:
tion. Then it deals with implementation 
and how the advent of G-Reg creates the 
conditions for improved regulatory 
decision making in this phase. It concludes 
with a brief description of what we will 
see if regulatory decision making at an 
individual case, industry and system level 
is, in fact, ‘good’. 
The mechanics, influences and principles 
involved in good regulatory decision making 
– design and review
Decision making in respect to regulatory 
design and review happens first and 
foremost in the policy and political 
domain. While the shape and decision-
making rights of different regulatory 
systems differ (sometimes significantly 
between regimes), broadly speaking 
regulatory regimes generally consist of: 
•	 primary	legislation		(e.g.	laws)	
– decided by Parliament; 
•	 secondary	legislation	(e.g.	rules,	
regulations, by-laws) – decided by 
Cabinet, ministers and/or local 
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•	 the	end-to-end	approach	of	
government intending to influence or 
compel specific behaviour, including 
policy development;
•	 the	design	of	instruments	intended	to	
achieve the intention; 
•	 the	implementation	of	those	
instruments; 
•	 identifying	and	understanding	the	
outcomes achieved; and 
•	 assessing	and	reviewing	the	success	of	
each of these components, as a whole. 
This can be thought of as involving 
three main interrelated system phases: 
design, implementation and review. 
The article discusses the mechanics, 
influences and principles involved in good 
regulatory decision making. First it deals 
with design and review, as those phases 
essentially set the context of implementa-
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authorities, within the bounds of 
primary legislation; 
•	 tertiary	legislation	(e.g.	standards	and	
codes) – which may be in the 
decision-making domain of ministers, 
Cabinet or (unelected) regulatory 
bodies (ministries, departments, 
Crown entities), but any decision 
making must in any event occur 
within the bounds of the enabling 
primary and secondary legislation. 
Of course, the courts also play a role in 
design, review and implementation through 
the development of common law (case law), 
and through precedent-setting decisions. 
Court decisions inform the way regulation 
is implemented, and may also trigger the 
review and re-design of regulation.
Design and review decision-making 
frameworks
Much work has been done to support good 
regulatory decision making in respect to 
(initial) design and (subsequent) review 
of regulatory systems. For the purposes 
of this article, the most relevant products 
of that work are the Treasury’s Regulatory 
Impact Analysis Handbook (Treasury, 
2013) (the Handbook) and Best Practice 
Regulation Principles and Assessments 
guide (Treasury, 2012) (the Guide).
The Handbook is effectively the 
regulatory policy adviser’s bible, with its 
stated purpose being to serve two benefits: 
•	 enhancing	the	evidence-base	to	
inform decisions about regulatory 
proposals – to ensure that all practical 
options for addressing the problem 
have been considered and that the 
benefits of the preferred option not 
only exceed the costs but will deliver 
the highest level of net benefit, and 
•	 transparency	–	the	presentation	of	
agencies’ free and frank advice to 
decision makers at the relevant 
decision points provides reassurance 
that the interests of all sectors of the 
New Zealand public have been 
considered. RIA [regulatory impact 
analysis] also aims to encourage the 
public to provide information to 
enhance the quality of regulatory 
decisions, to further inform the 
evidence-base. (Treasury, 2013, p.1.4)
Those familiar with the Handbook will 
know that it also includes a section on 
implementation, on the basis that it is 
important to consider practical 
implementation issues when key policy 
and design choices are made. The specific 
implementation considerations referred 
to include:
•	 administration	issues,	such	as	which	
agency will implement and 
administer the option and how it will 
function; 
•	 timing	and	transitional	arrangements:	
e.g. delayed or gradual introduction 
of new requirements, provision of 
interim assistance;
•	 compliance	cost	minimisation	
strategies: what implementation 
Table 1: Best practice regulation principles and assessments guide
Attribute Principle Indicators
Growth
Supporting
Economic objectives are given an 
appropriate weighting relative to 
other specified objectives
1. Identifying and justifying trade-offs between 
economic and other objectives is an explicit part 
of decision-making
2. The need for firms to make long-term investment 
decisions is taken into account in regulatory 
regimes where appropriate
3. Open and competitive domestic and international 
markets including minimising barriers to, and 
maximising net benefit from, cross-border flows 
are explicit objectives
Proportional The burden of rules and their 
enforcement should  be proportionate 
to the benefits  that are expected  to 
result
1. A risk-based, cost-benefit framework is in place 
for both rule-making and enforcement
2. There is an empirical foundation to regulatory 
judgements
Flexible Regulated entities should  have scope 
to adopt least cost and innovative 
approaches to meeting  legal 
obligations
1. The underlying regulatory approach is principles or 
performance-based, and policies and procedures 
are in place to ensure that it is administered 
flexibly
2. Non-regulatory measures, including self-
regulation, are used wherever possible
3. Decisions are reassessed at regular intervals and 
when new information comes to hand
Durable The regulatory system has the 
capacity  to evolve to respond  to 
changing circumstances
1. Feedback systems are in place to assess how 
the law is working in practice including well-
developed performance measurement and clear 
reporting
2. The regulatory regime is up-to-date with 
technological and market change, and evolving 
societal expectations
Certain and
Predictable
Regulated entities have certainty 
as to their legal obligations, and 
the regulatory regime provides 
predictability over time
1. Safe harbours are available and/or regulated 
entities have access to authoritative advice
2. Decision-making criteria are clear and provide 
certainty of process
3. The need for firms to make long term investment 
decisions is taken into account in regulatory 
regimes where appropriate
4. There is consistency between multiple regulatory 
regimes that impact on single regulated entities 
where appropriate
Transparent and 
accountable
Rules development, implementation 
and enforcement should  be 
transparent
1. Regulators must be able to justify decisions and 
be subject to public scrutiny
Capable
Regulators
The regulator has the people and 
systems necessary  to operate an 
efficient and effective  regulatory 
regime
1. Capacity assessments are undertaken at regular 
intervals and subject to independent input and/or 
review
Source Treasury, 2012
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strategies will be required, such as an 
education campaign, the use of 
electronic technology, form design, 
advisory services and testing with 
stakeholders? Is there existing 
regulation that can be reduced or 
removed to prevent overlap?;
•	 implementation	risks	and	their	
potential impact on the effectiveness 
of an option: strategies for 
mitigating these risks should be 
explained;
•	 information	that	regulated	parties	
will require in order to comply with 
the regulation, and how this will be 
provided (e.g. whether there is 
opportunity to rationalise or 
‘piggyback’ on existing information 
sources or methods of 
communication); 
•	 enforcement	strategy:	how	
compliance will be enforced, who will 
undertake this, whether there will be 
sanctions for non-compliance (e.g. 
warnings, fines, licence suspension, 
prosecution, and whether there will 
be gradations of sanction depending 
on the phase/severity of breach), the 
suitability of risk-based enforcement 
strategies. 
The Guide (see Table 1) responded to a 
challenge posed in 2010 by the minister of 
finance to Treasury to answer three 
questions: (1) what is a best practice 
regulation? (2) how close are we to the 
frontier? and (3) what can we do to get 
closer? 
Its principles2 are used as part of the 
ongoing process of identifying potential 
improvements in regulatory regimes. As 
Treasury notes in the Guide (p.4):
The principles and performance 
indicators should function as an 
initial diagnosis of potential for 
improvement within regimes – to 
shift closer to the best practice 
frontier – and to detect latent 
weaknesses that may result in 
regulatory failure. If an assessment 
against these principles indicated that 
there was an issue, then a further 
diagnostic would need to be 
undertaken which would be specific 
to the regime in question.
The Handbook and the Guide can be 
thought of as ‘closing the loop’ in terms of 
support for good regulatory decision 
making across the three phases of 
regulatory systems.
Key influences on design and review decision 
making
While the Handbook and the Guide 
provide advice which will support good 
regulatory design and review decision 
making, the actual decision making is 
influenced by constitutional and political 
issues. It is not the purpose of this article 
to address these issues in any depth, but, 
for the sake of context, a brief comment 
on each is helpful.
Constitutional conventions (which 
would be reflected in policy advice) guide 
the decision-making rights that apply as 
between the primary, secondary and 
tertiary regulatory instruments. In plain 
language, those who are elected to office 
get to make the high-level decisions. At 
this level the decisions are typically about 
whether, and broadly how, to intervene in 
our lives to address risks and opportunities 
and provide (net) public benefits. By 
contrast, unelected state servants and 
local authority officials implement what is 
intended. This is usually with specific or 
delegated powers and functions that 
explicitly seek to ensure that operational 
decisions are independent of the elected 
(political) decision makers, and often 
with significant discretion.
The political influences on design 
decision making are related to: 
•	 the	world	view	and	policy	preferences	
of the governing political parties; 
•	 the	mandate	they	have	achieved	
through democratic elections;
•	 the	political	capital	they	have:	that	is,	
the trust, goodwill and influence the 
(governing) political parties and 
politicians have with the public and 
other political figures; and 
•	 the	ideas	that	arise	through	things	
such as engagement with business and 
academia, and emerging international 
practice.  
G-Reg and the role of professional 
development in good regulatory decision 
making 
Bearing in mind that regulatory design and 
review are primarily policy and political 
constructs, G-Reg has been careful to 
carve out its specific contribution to 
the improvement of regulatory systems 
as being related to the implementation 
phase.
Good regulatory decision making is a 
key part of implementation and a necessary 
part of exercising discretion as a regulator. 
The topic of exercising discretion was 
identified as one of five thematic issues of 
particular importance by the G-Reg Steering 
Group in its 2016 work programme.3 It 
provided the theme for G-Reg’s 2016 
(Wellington and Auckland) conferences. An 
earlier version of this article underpinned 
the opening address at both. 
Good regulatory decision making as 
part of the implementation of regulation 
requires: 
•	 processes	that	support	the	effective	
collection, collation and analysis of 
information and facts (for example, 
intelligence, certification, audit and 
investigation processes);
•	 effective	decision-making	frameworks	
that provide for good regulatory 
decision making (for example, 
frameworks that enable risks to be 
considered, discretion to be applied 
and appropriate interventions to be 
imposed);
•	 people	who	have	the	capability	to	
‘process’ the information and facts in 
Good regulatory decision making is 
a key part of implementation and a 
necessary part of exercising discretion as 
a regulator.
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accordance with the decision-making 
frameworks; and 
•	 organisations	that	are	well	led,	with	a	
culture4 (norms, values and beliefs) 
that is appropriate to regulatory 
activity.
Professional development, in the G-Reg 
context, supports each of these elements 
directly or indirectly. It does this through 
its five themes of work which sit alongside 
the development of the regulatory 
compliance qualifications framework. This 
framework was developed to improve 
capability amongst those undertaking 
regulatory activities and to recognise 
expertise where it currently exists. The five 
themes are: the use of information; risk 
and communication of risk; the exercise of 
discretion; regulatory stewardship; and the 
future of the qualifications.
Ultimately, G-Reg’s focus on regulatory 
practice and capability initiatives is 
intended to improve leadership, culture 
and workforce capability. This is intended 
to create the conditions in which good 
regulatory decision making can occur: 
essentially, ‘professionalising’ the regulatory 
workforce.
The mechanics, influences and principles 
involved in good regulatory decision making 
– implementation
Good regulatory decision making in the 
implementation phase occurs within 
organisations that are either: 
•	 selected	as	part	of	machinery	of	
government5 decisions as being the 
appropriate existing organisations to 
implement the system; or 
•	 put	in	place	as	part	of	the	system	
design or review phases, to implement 
the system. 
The machinery of government 
decisions are typically informed by advice 
provided in accordance with the 
requirements of the implementation 
section of the Handbook, discussed above. 
So, effectively the shaping of the 
boundaries of the regulatory decision 
making that is within the domain of the 
organisation (or statutory office holders 
within it) occurs as the policy intent is 
expressed through the development of the 
relevant legislative instruments. And 
legislative instruments are now much 
more likely than previously to provide 
guidance on matters of good regulatory 
decision making to those involved in 
regulatory implementation. 
As noted by Searancke et al.: 
Modern statutes convey much more 
information to regulators than in the 
past about their role and how they 
should perform it. In effect, regulators 
have always been able to exercise 
discretion. Modern statutes still 
provide for discretion, but are more 
informative in terms of how that 
discretion should be exercised. 
Discretion continues to be important, 
as the modern regulator needs to 
choose the most appropriate type of 
intervention (e.g. informing versus 
sanctioning) given the particular 
circumstances and based on evidence. 
This is not necessarily clear at the 
time a new regulatory regime is put in 
place or a new regulator is established. 
This is not just an issue of flexibility 
for the regulator. If implemented well, 
it should lead to the most effective 
and lowest (social) cost solution for 
the regulated. (Searancke et al., 2014)
Within these boundaries it is generally 
the case that regulatory decision making 
in the implementation phase is statutorily 
independent6 of political influence,7 
 but this does not mean that those engaged 
in that decision making should be 
politically naïve. 
Considered in terms of Mark Moore’s 
strategic triangle of public value (Figure 
1), discussed by Bromell (2012), it seems 
apparent that even independent regulators 
should seek to ensure that their decisions 
and actions deliver the public value 
intended by the regulatory system. This 
should maintain the confidence of those 
in their authorising environment 
(democratically elected representatives, 
the private sector, the voluntary sector 
and the broader community).
 This is a challenging issue to deal with 
operationally, which is discussed further 
below. 
Decision-making frameworks
Unlike the examples discussed above 
relating to design and review – the 
Handbook and Guide produced by 
Treasury – the development of decision-
making guidance and frameworks in the 
implementation phase has occurred with 
limited central direction and support.8 
The exception to this is the Solicitor 
General’s Prosecution Guidelines (Crown 
Law, 2013), which are required to be 
followed but relate clearly only to one 
type of decision making in a regulatory 
decision-making context. 
Other guidance material has been 
developed; for example: 
•	 the	Achieving Compliance guide 
(Compliance Common Capability 
Programme,9 2011), which is a 
broad-based guide which contains 
material relating to decision-making 
guidance, but is not focused primarily 
on that and has no ‘formal’ standing 
as a guidance document; 
•	 the	New	Zealand	Productivity	
Commission’s Regulatory Institutions 
Authorising
environment
Operational
capacity
Public value
outcomes
Figure 1: Mark Moore’s strategic triangle of public value
Source: Moore 1995
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and Practices report (New Zealand 
Productivity Commission, 2014), 
which, again, has a broader focus than 
regulatory decision making but 
contains material very relevant to 
that, and, while it has been 
instrumental in driving the 
development of G-Reg, does not have 
any ‘formal’ standing as a guide to 
regulatory decision making; 
•	 more	broadly,	the	administrative	law	
decision-making guide A Judge Over 
Decisions regarding Maritime NZ compliance 
interventions will take into account the attitude towards 
compliance and be: 
•	 logical,	timely	and	considered 
evidence-based
•	made	impartially	and	without	fear,	favour,	bias,	
prejudice or improper motive
•	 sufficiently	robust	and	well-documented	to	
withstand judicial review
•	 proportionate	to	the	risk	posed	by	the	non-complaint	
behaviour, and the attitude towards compliance
•	 consistent	with	the	law,	the	public	interest,	Maritime	
NZ’s policies and values, and any applicable 
international treaties.
Factors for consideration 
The factors for consideration are set out in the table 
below. Application of these factors requires expertise 
and experience to be applied in the process of 
weighing up which compliance tools might be most 
applicable.
Available compliance interventions
Assessment against the factors above, and attitude 
to compliance, will support a decision about the best 
course of action. There is a continuum of possible 
interventions:
•	 from:	an	approach	based	on	information,	education	
and engagement to support and encourage 
compliance 
•	 to:	an	approach	(usually	through	investigation)	
that may lead to enforcement interventions such 
as infringement notices, improvement notices, 
warnings, imposition of detention or conditions and/
or other civil or criminal action under applicable law.
More than one intervention may be appropriate and 
applied as a ‘package’ of interventions. For example, 
it may be appropriate to prosecute and also publish 
educational material for the general public in response 
to an incident raising serious safety concerns. 
Extent of harm or risk of harm: This includes harm or potential harm to health and safety, security, and the 
environment. Actions that create risks but do not actually lead to harm occurring can still be serious and require a 
firm response. 
From
To
•	 There’s	minimal	or	no	harm	or	risk	of	harm.
•	 Harm	is,	or	would	likely	be,	easily	remedied.
•	 Harm	is,	or	would	likely	be,	restricted	in	scale	or	effect.
•	 There’s	significant	or	widespread	harm	or	potential	for	such	harm.
•	 Harm	is	actually	or	potentially	caused	to	a	vulnerable	section	of	the	community/environment.
Conduct: Conduct in this context means the behaviours, intent and capability of the person whose actions are being 
considered.
From
To
•	 It	is	first-time	or	one-off	behaviour	that	is	unlikely	to	be	repeated.
•	 The	conduct	is	accidental	or	resulted	from	momentary	carelessness	or	the	result	of	a	limited	
understanding	of	the	law	(where	that	is	not	inconsistent	with	the	expectations	of	someone	
holding	a	maritime	document).
•	Mitigating	factors	exist.
•	 The	behaviour	is	deliberate,	reckless	or	involving	consistent	carelessness.
•	 The	conduct	is	repeated,	ongoing	or	sector-wide.
•	 There	is	a	serious	departure	from	expected	lawful	behavior	by	a	maritime	transport	operator.	
•	 Aggravating	factors	exist.
Public interest: Public interest can be described as something being in the interest of the wider public or of public 
importance. It is more than simply interest from the public or expectation from the public of action. Considerations 
include responsibility to victims, the need to clarify the law, and whether the matter at hand reflects a widespread 
problem that can be usefully addressed by highlighting the need for compliance. 
From
To
•	 The	conduct	occurred	some	time	ago	and	has	ceased.
•	 The	legal	principles	involved	are	well-established	and	do	not	require	clarification	in	court.
•	 A	decision	not	to	act	would	undermine	public	confidence	in	the	maritime	transport	system	or	a	
significant sector within the system.
•	 The	conduct	involves	a	new	or	significant	service	to	a	large	travelling	public.	
•	 Action	is	necessary	to	clarify	a	grey	area	in	the	law.
•	 Action	is	necessary	to	deter	others	from	similar	conduct.
Attitude to compliance: Typically, the nature of the responses will be informed by, and tailored to, the attitude of 
individuals	or	groups	involved	towards	compliance.	This	helps	ensure	that	the	intervention(s)	chosen	will	have	the	
desired effect. This does not prevent significant action being taken for other reasons, even when attitude is good.
From
To
•	Willing	and	able	to	comply.
•	Willing	but	not	able	to	comply.
•	 Reluctant	to	comply.
•	 Unwilling	to	comply
•	 Actively	and	intentionally	non-compliant.
Table 2: Guiding principles for decision making on compliance interventions Your Shoulder (UK Government Legal 
Department, 2016), which is an 
important foundation.10
Overall, the development of G-Reg 
and its antecedents, as described by 
Manch et al. (2015), is a response to this 
gap in the level of central, coordinated 
and consistent direction and support in 
relation to many regulatory implementa-
tion issues. 
Having said this, approaches to good 
regulatory decision making are coalescing. 
The advent of G-Reg is contributing to 
this. The relatively small size of New 
Zealand’s state sector, and close 
relationships and common histories 
among people in the regulatory 
implementation field have been a factor. 
The engagement in New Zealand of a 
small number of well-known and highly 
regarded academic leaders in the field 
(such as professors Malcolm Sparrow, 
Arie Frieburg and Julia Black) has also 
played a part. 
Thus we are seeing an emerging 
consistency of regulatory implementation 
decision-making frameworks. They are 
mainly underpinned by the key concepts 
of ‘risk-based’ and ‘responsive’ approaches 
discussed by the Productivity Commission 
(2014, pp.68-76), which support the 
implementation of regulation. Which 
example is used for illustration purposes 
is not critical in considering good 
regulatory decision making. They all tend 
to reflect similar factors and criteria, and 
they all form the basis for the exercise of 
discretion relating to decisions made.
The example that I am currently most 
familiar with is the approach taken by my 
own organisation, Maritime New Zealand, 
through our ‘Policy on decision making’ 
(Maritime New Zealand, 2016) and 
Compliance Operating Model and 
supporting documents.11 In this context, 
there are three main things that support 
regulatory decision making. First, the 
‘Policy on decision making’ begins by 
establishing its purpose, as follows:
As a regulatory, compliance and 
response organisation our ‘business’ 
involves receiving information, 
considering that information, making 
decisions and taking action. Decisions 
are made and actions taken by people 
Source: Maritime New Zealand, n.d.
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according to their job responsibilities 
and accountabilities (general 
decisions), and in many cases 
delegations (statutory decisions), 
under the laws that provide authority 
to Maritime NZ and its staff. 
This policy is intended to support 
good decision making, in support of 
better outcomes in respect to our focus on 
safe, secure and clean seas and waterways.
The policy then touches on the 
importance of taking good advice (legal, 
technical, policy) and acting in good faith 
according to Maritime New Zealand’s 
statutory mandate. It outlines key factors 
in good decision making (context, facts, 
advice, costs and benefits and risks), as 
well as foundation issues such as having 
the appropriate authority (delegation) 
and competency, and applying 
professional judgement and discretion.
The policy is clear that advice received 
by the decision maker must be considered 
carefully, but the advisers do not make the 
decisions. The intention of this is to 
ensure that our decision makers 
understand that good regulatory decisions 
require discretion and a focus on overall 
outcomes rather than being framed by 
specific or narrowly defined perspectives. 
This can be a source of tension should the 
advice provided not all be followed. 
The policy on decision making has 
broad application across all regulatory 
decisions, including
•	 licensing,	certification	and	approvals	
(‘entry’ control); 
•	 audits	and	inspections	(‘monitoring’	
activity); and
•	 investigation,	prosecution	and	
administrative actions 
(‘accountability and exit’ activities). 
The extent to which discretion can be 
applied can vary across these different 
types of regulatory and compliance 
activities depending on the prescriptive 
(or not) nature of the underpinning legal 
requirements. 
Noting that there are often group or 
collective processes involved in regulatory 
decision making (see below and the 
reference to Maritime New Zealand’s 
compliance intervention panel), the policy 
also comments on the importance of the 
decision maker retaining responsibility for 
the decision. Finally, it notes the importance 
of using established decision-making 
guidelines, where they exist.
This brings me to the second of the 
decision-making frameworks: the guiding 
principles for decision making on 
compliance interventions (part of the 
Compliance Operating Model). These 
enable assessment of risk-based decision 
factors to identify the appropriate responsive 
interventions (Table 2, and represented in a 
graphical form in Figure 2). As such, while 
the guiding principles apply across ‘entry’, 
‘monitoring’ and ‘accountability and exit’ 
activities, the ‘factors for consideration’ are 
more attuned to ‘monitoring’, ‘accountability 
and exit’ activities specifically. 
Operational decision-making 
frameworks such as these are similar to 
the Handbook and Guide discussed above 
in that they provide analytical frameworks 
that allow discretion to be applied, but in 
a consistent fashion across different 
matters. Essentially, they allow the same 
factors to be weighed up in relation to 
different factual situations so that the 
decision-making process takes account of 
risk, and considers what the most 
appropriate response is, to address the 
matter at hand. 
This framework is supported by a 
compliance intervention panel (the 
standard operating procedures for which 
are also part of the Compliance Operating 
Model). This panel provides guidance, 
direction and advice regarding courses of 
action to be followed in responding to 
compliance issues. While it is intended to 
support a robust, consistent and proper 
operational decision-making capability, it 
does not replace the need for statutory 
decisions that require formal delegations 
to be made by the holders of those 
delegations.
The third necessary element relates to 
delegations. Commonly, the law relating 
to the decisions that are being made will 
specify who has the decision-making 
rights (often the chief executive or some 
form of statutory office holder), and allow 
for decision making to be delegated. 
Decisions about delegation are usually 
made by considering matters such as:
•	 the	ability	to	specify	the	scope	of	
decision making; 
•	 the	significance	of	the	impact	of	the	
decisions to be delegated (for 
example, in respect to people’s rights 
and obligations); 
•	 the	capability	and	capacity	of	those	
who might receive delegations (do 
they have the required knowledge and 
experience); and 
•	 the	efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	
decision making (to optimise this, 
does it rely on an ability to make 
decisions in a particular time frame 
or at a particular phase). 
Widespread
or
significant
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Achieving Compliance (Compliance 
Common Capability Programme, 2011) 
discusses delegation (and discretion) in a 
chapter relating to accountable decision 
making, and provides a simple better 
practice checklist (Table 3) that addresses 
both delegation and discretion. 
Key influences on ‘implementation’ decision 
making
While decision-making and delegation 
frameworks are important, there are other 
factors at play that have a big influence. 
Just as constitutional conventions and 
political influences shape decision 
making at the design and review phases, 
there are significant influences at the 
implementation phase that must be 
considered. They are strongly interrelated 
and include the importance of: 
•	 delivering	public	value;
•	 calibrating	effectively	the	approach	to	
risk;
•	 maintaining	a	clear	focus	on	the	
purpose of the regulatory system; and 
•	 ensuring	that	the	incentives	that	exist	
in performance management systems 
are aligned with the desired 
regulatory outcomes. 
Delivering public value
While decision making in the regulatory 
implementation phase is usually, for 
good reason, independent of political 
involvement, overall it must deliver public 
value. As noted above, a crucial element 
of this is having an effective authorising 
environment (through maintaining 
the support of democratically elected 
representatives, the private sector, 
the voluntary sector and the broader 
community). There are two good reasons 
for this. The first is that, as every regulator 
knows, the ability to succeed in delivering 
desired regulatory outcomes is heavily 
affected by the overall attitude of the 
industry or sector being regulated and the 
confidence there is in the regulator. The 
second is that the continued existence of a 
regulatory agency depends on government 
and Parliament having confidence in it 
to deliver the outcomes desired by the 
regulatory systems in which it operates. 
Taken superficially this could be read 
as suggesting that regulators are subject to 
political interference in the way they do 
their work and make their decisions. A 
better way to think about it is that 
regulators’ continued existence is subject 
to the views that democratically elected 
decision makers have about the body of 
the regulator’s work and decisions in 
terms of whether or not that is delivering 
public value. 
The influence this has isn’t, in my 
experience, felt in day-to-day operational 
decision making. It does, however, 
encourage careful attention over time to 
the quality of decision making. This 
includes the careful use of discretion and 
focusing on the outcomes that are 
intended by the law for which the 
regulator has responsibility. In this 
context, it remains critical that regulators 
continually have regard to what their 
statutes say about their role and how they 
should perform it, as discussed by 
Searancke et al. (2014).
Approach to risk
A significant influence on regulatory 
decision making in the implementation 
phase is the approach to risk. Risk is an all-
pervasive issue for regulators. Regulatory 
systems themselves are risk-management 
systems. Within those systems, decisions 
about which risks to focus on are always 
necessary, as no regulator has the resources 
to deal with everything that is possibly 
within their legal mandate. Making a 
decision to focus on one set or area of 
risks over another creates risks both to 
achieving the desired outcomes, and in 
terms of the regulator’s reputation for 
not dealing with something, or conversely 
focusing too much on something else. 
As Quarmby (n.d.) notes, ‘regulation 
permeates the world of vested interest, 
representative groups, and lobby groups; 
all of whom generate political and legal 
scrutiny over the decisions made by 
regulators’. He also touches on another 
matter that can undermine good 
regulatory decision making. That is how 
regulators may respond to reputational 
risks by either not applying discretion (we 
will look bad if we apply discretion and 
something goes wrong), or, where it is 
within their power to do so, by requiring 
more detailed controls (we can’t trust 
them to do anything right so we should 
prescribe everything). The result of this is 
that the risk to be avoided becomes 
regulated parties not adhering to the 
black-and-white letter of the law, or the 
increased controls, in the strictest possible 
way, instead of the risk of the desired 
outcomes not being achieved. 
This would not be a problem if 
regulatory frameworks were able to 
specify detailed requirements that met 
every possible situation, in dynamic 
industries and sectors, in a way that only 
prevented harms, without interfering 
with reasonable behaviours. We all know 
that that will never happen. It is easy for 
Better Practice Checklist: Accountable Decision Making 
Delegated decision-making 
•	 The	delegation	of	decision-making	authority	is	consistent	with	legislative	
requirements	and	any	public-service	or	organisational	directives.	
•	 Procedures	for	exercising	delegated	authority	are	documented	and	staff	
are trained in applying them. 
•	 The	exercise	of	delegated	authority	is	monitored	and	subjected	to	quality-
assurance processes. 
Exercising discretion 
•	 The	agency	has	clearly	stated	principles	and	values	that	guide	the	
exercise of discretion. 
•	 A	decision-making	framework	document	specifies	what	decisions	need	to	
be made, by whom, and when. 
•	 Decision	makers	understand	relevant	legal	requirements	so	that	their	
decisions can withstand legal challenge.
Table 3: Better practice checklist: accountable decision making
Source:	Compliance	Common	Capability	Programme,	2011
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regulators to get lost in this milieu, so 
careful attention needs to be paid to it. 
Focus on the purpose of the regulatory 
system
In addition to calibrating effectively the 
focus on risk, it is important to consider 
carefully the purpose of the regulatory 
system in respect to matters such as 
‘who is intended to benefit’ and ‘how to 
engage’. I was fortunate recently to see 
the products of some internal discussion 
within the New Zealand Transport Agency 
(2015, pp.4, 11) as part of its regulatory 
capability improvement activity. People in 
the agency were encouraged to engage in 
‘thought-provoking discussions’ relating 
to regulatory issues. 
Part of this material underpinned the 
challenges associated with what might be 
thought of as the quite simple idea of 
defining regulated parties as ‘customers’ in 
order to drive good-quality engagement. 
While customer service principles remain 
relevant to good regulatory practice, it is 
important to think about the actual nature 
and purpose of the relationship regulators 
have with regulated parties. It is primarily 
one of supporting, encouraging and 
requiring them to do things they might not 
otherwise do (as opposed to delighting 
them by providing what they want). The 
following extracts from this material capture 
well the importance of thinking carefully 
about the purpose of the regulatory system 
in the context of such issues.
One of our guiding principles as an 
Agency is putting the customer at the 
heart of everything we do – from the 
way we design and build roads, to 
how we handle calls to the contact 
centre, to the process we use to set 
and interpret rules.
This is a really neat idea. We give 
New Zealanders what they want, 
when they want it, and in a way that 
they want it, which makes them more 
likely to be compliant. Legislation that 
works for people, rather than restricts 
them. Easy, right? But what if what 
our customers want isn’t actually the 
right thing? Where is the tipping 
point where doing something for the 
customer compromises our role as 
regulators?12
As part of a project last year, we 
went out and tested six or seven 
different text messages and three 
different layouts for email reminders 
that customers might receive to 
encourage them to pay their vehicle 
licensing (rego) ‘on time and online’.
The message that we internally 
thought would be a winner, and 
which our customers loved, was the ‘A 
friendly reminder from NZTA’ 
message. It was positive, friendly and 
had all the relevant information for 
people to renew their ‘rego’ on time 
and online. 
When we went out and asked our 
customers what they thought would 
encourage them to pay on time and 
online, 60% of our customers chose 
this message over the others which 
made it a clear winner from a 
customer service point of view.
But when we trialled the messages 
in an online pilot to measure the 
behaviours of our customers once 
they received these reminders, the 
message that was most successful, was 
the message customers least 
‘approved’ of. The ‘Avoid a fine, pay 
on time’ message. This message was 
the preferred option for only 6% of 
our customers, but had a huge impact 
in encouraging customers to comply 
both on time and online. This is 
because what we had tapped into was 
our customers’ drivers and 
motivations and understood best how 
we could ‘manipulate’ them to 
comply. 
‘Avoid a fine, pay on time’ isn’t 
going to win any customer service 
awards but what it did do was help 
increase on time compliance within 
the trial from 50% to 75% and 
increase people paying online from 
32% to 62%. These are both 
regulatory objectives.13
Performance-management systems
Various people have been credited with 
the phrase ‘what gets measured gets 
managed’. Regardless of its origins, it is a 
reality that applies to the implementation 
of regulatory systems as much as any 
other enterprise. This reality underpins 
the importance of getting the measures 
right, in respect to the purpose of the 
system, with an appropriately calibrated 
understanding of risk. 
The tendency of measurement systems 
is to default to things that are easy to 
measure and that demonstrate efficiency, 
often because it is simply too difficult to 
measure outcomes. A good example, also 
discussed by Quarmby, is in the area of 
licensing and certification. Focusing on 
processing times can be quite inconsistent 
with the purpose of such activity, which is 
to examine the capability or suitability of 
someone to exercise privileges granted by 
a regulatory system. Timeliness must be 
subordinate to quality in such decision 
making. This is not an argument against 
efficiency measures, but for inclusion of 
them in an appropriate way that does not 
derogate from the intended purpose of 
the activity. 
So, what does good regulatory decision 
making look like?
As shown in Table 4, good regulatory 
decision making can be thought of at four 
levels: in respect to victims, individual 
cases, sectors or industries, and regulatory 
systems. 
In respect to victims, good regulatory 
decisions will:
‘…regulation permeates the world of 
vested interest, representative groups, 
and lobby groups; all of whom generate 
political and legal scrutiny over the 
decisions made by regulators’.
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•	 meet	the	requirements	of	the	Victims’	
Charter, ensuring that victims are 
treated fairly and with respect, 
courtesy and compassion;
•	 ensure	that	victims	are	well	informed	
of the progress of their complaint; 
and 
•	 ensure	that	their	views,	including	on	
the effects and impacts of the 
offending, will be understood and 
acknowledged. 
At the individual case level a good 
decision is one that identifies the most 
appropriate intervention to do one or all 
of the following: 
•	 stop	risky	behaviour;
•	 encourage	compliant	behaviour	(both	
in respect to the individual person or 
organisation concerned, and in 
respect to the ‘messages’ that action 
sends to others); 
•	 where	appropriate	hold	someone	to	
account for their actions.
At the industry or sector level a good 
decision is one that: 
•	 sets	or	supports	standards;
•	 engenders	respect	in	the	regulator;	
and
•	 encourages	high	levels	of	voluntary	
compliance.
In respect to the regulatory system, a 
good decision is one that:
•	 highlights	strengths	and	weaknesses	
in the system; and
•	 provides	information	that	is	used	to	
improve and evolve the system. 
Overall, good regulatory decisions will 
deliver public value.
Conclusion
The intent of this article was to explore 
matters relating to good regulatory 
decision making. It doesn’t break new 
ground, except perhaps by seeking to 
articulate a clear framework to judge what 
good regulatory decision making might 
look like in an overall sense (Table 4), but 
brings together a number of aspects that 
will be known individually or collectively 
to readers who work in the regulatory 
field. 
The scope of things that affect good 
regulatory decision making is broad and 
different in various phases of regulatory 
systems, but with common threads, such 
as dealing with risk and ensuring that the 
benefits of regulatory activity outweigh 
the costs. Other common features are the 
need for clarity of decision-making rights, 
effective policies and workable 
frameworks to guide and support advisers 
and deciders. The article seeks to ‘put it all 
together’ as part of the continuing process 
of developing a shared view of key aspects 
of regulatory practice that is important 
to developing this as a professional 
enterprise.
1	 The	Government	Regulatory	Practice	Initiative	(G-Reg)	
primarily	has	an	operational,	not	policy,	focus	and	seeks	
to lead and contribute to regulatory practice and capability 
initiatives where collective action can be shown to be 
helpful.	It	works	on	actions	that	improve	leadership,	
culture,	regulatory	practice	and	workforce	capability	at	the	
operational level in regulatory organisations and systems. 
While not the primary purpose, improvement in these 
areas will enable operational regulators to contribute more 
effectively to improving regulatory policy development.
	2	 The	government	has	just	released	a	refreshed	set	of	
‘Government	Expectations	for	Good	Regulatory	Practice’.	
These	expectations	overtake,	but	with	some	selectivity	
and	refinement	draw	significantly	on,	earlier	principles	in	
documents such as the Guide.  They address the design of 
regulation and regulatory stewardship, including providing 
specific	expectations	in	respect	to	good	regulator	practice.		
As	part	of	its	2017	and	beyond	work	programme,	G-Reg	is	
undertaking	work	to	support	regulatory	practice	agencies	to	
engage with and operate in accordance with the refreshed 
expectations. They are available at:  http://www.treasury.
govt.nz/regulation/system/strategy. 
3	 The	G-Reg	work	programme	was	signed	off	by	the	G-Reg	
chief executive oversight group at its meeting on 4 May 
2016.
4	 The	New	Zealand	Productivity	Commission	discussed	the	
importance of regulator culture and leadership in chapter 4 
of	its	report	into	regulatory	institutions	and	practices	(New	
Zealand	Productivity	Commission,	2014).	
5 The State Services Commission describes ‘machinery of 
government’	as	referring	to	the	structures	of	government	and	
how	they	work.	It	includes	the	changing	set	of	organisations	
within government, their functions and governance 
arrangements,	and	how	they	work	together	to	deliver	results	
for	ministers	and	the	public	(State	Services	Commission,	
2016).
6	 Decision	making	is	generally	either	expressly	statutorily	
independent	and	undertaken	by	statutory	office	holders,	
or, where vested by statute in ministers, is required to be 
performed independently of political considerations.
7	 The	nature	and	degree	of	independence	is	a	function	of	
statutory provisions and organisational form: for example, 
compared to ministries and departments in which state 
servants	may	have	independence	conferred	by	specific	
provisions in law, Crown entities have varying degrees of 
independence	(as	Crown	agents,	autonomous	or	independent	
entities)	alongside	similar	legal	provisions.
8	 As	noted	in	endnote	2,	new	expectations	for	good	regulatory	
practice published by the New Zealand Government 
do provide greater central direction and support to 
implementation activities than has been the case in the past, 
some	of	which	focuses	on	decision	making.
9	 The	Compliance	Common	Capability	Programme	is	the	
predecessor	to	G-Reg.
10 Judge Over Your Shoulder: a guide to good decision making 
was	first	published	in	1987.	The	fifth	edition	was	released	
by the Treasury solicitor and permanent secretary of the 
government legal department in the UK in 2016. 
11 The Compliance Operating Model is made up of a 
compliance strategy, compliance intervention guidelines 
and the compliance intervention panel standard operating 
procedures, available at http://www.maritimenz.govt.
nz/about/what-we-do/compliance/compliance-model.
asp#overview.
12	 Contribution	from	Luke	Bailey.
13	 Contribution	from	Damien	Le	Breton.
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Table 4: What good regulatory decision making looks like
Victim Individual Sector/Industry System
Treated fairly, 
respectfully with 
courtesy and 
compassion
‘Risky’	behaviour	
stopped
General deterrence 
supported
Regulatory system 
development 
informed
Well informed of 
progress of complaint
Compliant behaviour 
supported
Standards supported Respect in system/
regulator engendered
Victims views, 
effects and impact of 
offending understood 
and	acknowledged
Held to account Standards	Improved Trust in government 
supported
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